




A lecturer who delivers a lecture from unpublished manuscript to a limited
audience, may enjoin the subsequent publication of such lecture by one who has
taken it down in shorthand and attempts to publish it for his own profit. In such
a case the implied understanding between the lecturer and his audience is, that the
audience are quite at liberty to take the fullest notes they like for their own con-
venience, but that they are not at liberty to use such notes for the purpose of publish-
ing the lecture for profit.
A. Calkin Lewis, plaintiff's solicitor.
Yarde & Loader, defendant's solicitors.
KAY, J.-This is a case in which the question raised is per-
haps a little different from that in the case of Abernethy v. Hut-
chinson, 2 L. J. Ch. 209; 1 H. & T. 28, before Lord ELDON. It
seems that the plaintiff is a fellow of the Royal Geographical
Society, and of the Geological Society, and the author of several
scientific works. He is also accustomed to deliver lectures, and
amongst the subjects upon which he lectures, he has chosen one
'which he calls " The dog as the friend of man." I must take it
from his affidavit that, before he delivered the lecture, he had
written it in a manuscript, which manuscript he never published;
and that, having written it, he delivered it in the year 1882 at the
Workingmen's College, on which occasion the audience were ad-
mitted, not on payment, but by special leave by obtaining tickets;
and only those who had tickets could attend and hear the lecture.
It seems that the defendant, who is a shorthand writer, attended,
and took down a copy-almost a verbatim copy-of this lecture in
shorthand, which, of course, he had a perfect right to do. Merely
taking down a lecture in shorthand is not a breach of any right at
all; the defendant might take the lecture down and use his notes
for the purpose of refreshing his memory, or for any other purpose
he chose. The question, however, is whether, having so taken the
lecture down, he had the right to publish the same for profit. He
says the profits are very small, but, of course, I cannot lay any
stress upon that. Whether the profits are large or small, the
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question of right must be just the same. Now, had he that right
or not? It has been argued properly that this case is distinguish-
able from Abernethy v. Hlutchinson, Qubi sup.
It seems that in that case Lord ELDON, as his manner was,
doubted, and would not, in the first instance, make any order.
But the matter stood over on more than one occasion and was re-
argued, and upon the ultimate argument an additional affidavit had
been made, which stated that the facts were these: That Dr.
Abernethy had given his lecture orally, and not from a written
composition, but that he had notes which amounted to a greater
mass of writing, written in a very succinct manner, from which
he delivered the lecture; that a considerable portion of such notes
had been expanded and put into writing with a view to publica-
tion, and that, at the time of delivering his lecture, he did not,
read or refer to any writing, but delivered it orally from recollec-
tion of his notes. On a subsequent occasion, before the ultimate
hearing, he again made a further affidavit, in which he said that no
person had a right to attend the lecture except those who were
admitted to the privilege by the lecturer, and it had always been
understood by him, and those who preceded him in the office which
he held, and those who attended the lectures, that the persons who
so attended did not acquire any right to publish the lectures which
they heard, but that the lecturer retained the sole right of publish-
ing his lectures; and further that there was an implied contract
that none of them should publish his lectures or any part of them.
Of course that negatives the notion of there being any express
contract between the plaintiff, Dr. Abernethy, and those who
attended his lectures. Then, upon that additional evidence, after
very mature consideration, the Lord Chancellor delivered judgment
and said that: "where the lecture was orally delivered, it was diffi-
cult to say that an injunction could be granted upon the same prin-
ciple upon which literary composition was protected, because the
court must be satisfied that the publication complained of was an
invasion of the written work, and this could only be done by com-
paring the composition with the piracy. But it did not follow that,
because the information communicated by the lecturer was not
committed to writing, but orally delivered, it was therefore within
the power of the person who heard it to publish it. On the con-
trary, he was clearly of opinion that, whatever else might be done
with it, the lecture could not be published for profit." I take that
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to mean, that every person who delivers a lecture, not committed
to writing but orally delivered from memory, has such a property
in that lecture that he may prevent anybody who hears it from
publishing it for profit. Then his lordship goes on: "He had the
satisfaction now of knowing (and he did not possess that knowl-
edge when this question was last considered) that this doctrine was
not a novel one, and that this opinion was confirmed by that of
some of the judges of the land."
All those are general observations, without the least reference to
the facts of that particular case. Lord ELDON then adds that "he
was, therefore, clearly of opinion that when persons were admitted
as pupils or otherwise, to hear these lectures, although they were
orally delivered, and although the parties might go to the extent,
if they were able to do so, of putting down the whole by means
of shorthand, yet they could do that only for the purposes of their
own information, and could not publish for profit that which they
had not obtained the right of selling." His lordship goes on to
observe that there was no evidence how the defendants got posses-
sion of the lectures : " But as they must have been taken from a
pupil or otherwise in such a way as the court would not permit,
the injunction ought to go upon the ground of property; and,
although there was not sufficient to establish an implied contract
as between the plaintiff and the defendants, yet it must be decided,
that as the lectures must have been procured in an undue manner
from those who were under a contract not to publish for profit,
there was sufficient to authorize the court to say the defendants
shall not publish." Now, it is quite true that the learned judge
seems at one moment to refer to the ground of property, and at
another to that of implied contract. But I take his meaning to be
that, when there is a lecture of this kind delivered to an audience,
especially where that audience is a limited one admitted by tickets,
the understanding between the lecturer and the audience must be
that, whether the lecture has been committed to writing beforehand
or not, the audience are quite at liberty to take the fullest notes
they like* for their own personal convenience ; but they are not at
liberty, having taken those notes, to use them afterward for the
purpose of publishing the lecture for profit. That is the ground
upon which I am going to decide this case. The case does not
come within the statute of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 65, because notice
in writing was not given to two justices under sect. 5 of that act.
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I do not know whether it is a case in which notice could properly
have been given, because it was a lecture delivered at a public
college (for I think itis sufficiently proved before me that the place
where it was delivered answers the description of a public college),
and that is one of the cases in which it is not necessary to give
notice. But if the notice be not given, or if the place be a public
school, or college, or any public foundation, then the law relating
thereto is to remain the same as if the act had not been passed.
That will be the law as laid down by Lord ELDON, which is the
law I am bound to administer in this particular case. I, therefore,
must hold that this is a case in which the defendant ought to be
restrained by injunction. I cannot regard the publication of the
lecture in a system of shorthand-the key to which is in every-
body's hand who chooses to buy it-as being different in any mate-
rial sense from any other kind of publication. The only question
that remains is, whether this is a case in which the defendant
ought to be made to pay the costs. I am afraid I must order him
to do so, because he had invaded a right of property, and pub-
lished that which he had no right to publish.
A perpetual injunction was granted, with costs, and an order
was made for delivery up of the copies of the lecture in terms of
the notice of motion. Inquiry as to the profits or damages was
waived.
That at the common law the owner of
an unpublished literary composition has
al absolute property therein, or, as stated
in the leading case of Warton v. Beters,
8 Pet. 591, 657, that an author at com-
mon law has a property in his manu-
script, and may obtain redress against
one who deprives him of it, or by im-
properly obtaining a copy endeavors to
realize a profit by its publication, can-
not be doubted. See the cases collected
in Cooley on Torts 354; Drone on
Copyrights 10. It is said by Judge
CooIBY, on the point above referred to,
that, with respect to this sort of property,
"a publication, to constitute an abandon-
ment, must be literally one which puts
the production before the general pub-
lie." The property of an author, in
his intellectual production, is absolute
until he voluntarily parts with all or
some of his rights. There is no prin-
ciple of law by which he can be com-
pelled to publish it or to liermit others to
enjoy it. He has a right to exclude all
persons from its enjoyment; and, when
he chooses to do so, any use of the pro-
perty without his consent is a violation
of his rights. He may admit one or
more persons to its use to the exclusion
of all others ; and, in doing so, he may
restrict the uses which shall be made of
it. He may give a copy of his manu-
script to another person without parting
with his literary property in it. He
may circulate copies among his friends
for their own personal enjoyment, with-
out giving them or others the right to
publish such copies : Drone on Copy-
right 102, 103, where the cases are
well collected.
Aberneth~y v. Eutchinson, referred to
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in the principal case, was a bill filed by
the di.tinguihed surgeon, Ahernethy, to
restrain the unauthorized publication in
the Lancet of unpublished lectures de-
livered by thc plaintiff at the theatre of
St. Bartholomew's Hospital, London,
on thc principles and practice of surgery,
and fi r an account of the profits made
by the defendants. In this case Lord
ELDON said that be was clearly of opin-
ion that "when persons were admitted
as pupils or otherwise to hear these lec-
tures, although they were orally deliv-
ered, and although the parties might go
to the extent, if they were able to do so,
of putting down the whole by means of
shorthand, yet they could do that only
for the purposes of their own informa-
tion, and could not publish for profit
that which they had not obtained the
right of selling."
In Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray 545, in
which it was held that the representation
of a dramatic work, of which the pro-
prietor has no copyright, and which he
has previously caused to he represented
and exhibited for money, is no violation
of any right of property, although made
without license of the proprietor, IIoA,
J., in delivering the judgment of the
court, said: "It should, perhaps, be
added, to avoid misconstruction, that we
do not intend, in this decision, to in-
timate that there is any right to report,
phonographically or otherwise, a lecture
or other written discourse which its
author delivers before a public audience
and which he desires after to use in like
manner for his own profit, and to pub-
lish it without his consent, or to make
any use of a copy thus obtained. The
student who attends a medical lecture
may have a perfect right to remember as
much as he can, and afterwards to use
the information thus acquired in his own
medical practice, or communicate it to
students or classes of his own, without
involving the right to commit the lecture
to writing for the purpose of subsequent
publication in print or by oral delivery.
So any one of the audience at a concert
or opera may play a tune which his car
has enabled him to catch, or sing a song
which he may carry away in his mem-
ory for his own entertainment or that of
others, for compensation or gratuitously,
while he would have no right to copy or
publish the musical composition." To
the same effect see Bartlette v. Critten-
den, 4 McLean 300; s. c. 5 Id. 32;
Mac/din v. -Richardson, Ambl. 694;
Bouccicault v. Fox, 5 Blatchf. 87 ; Pal-
mer v. DeWitt, 40 How. Fr. 293;
Drone on Copyright 107 et seq. Caird v.
Sime, 18 Ir. Law Times 179.
The principal case differs not in prin-
ciple from the authorities above cited,
but only in the manner of the publica-
tion; and while the manner of the pub-
lication was not such as to make the
subject-matter known nearly so widely
as if it had been published by printing
in the ordinary manner, this seems to
be a question merely of degree and not
in the least to affect the principle of
decision. Upon the whole, the case,
though new in the instance, seems
grounded upon principles that cannot
successfully be controverted.
MAaSHALL D. EwEL.
Chicago.
